China and the US Are Competing for Europe's Markets — Here Is What the Data Shows

European policymakers are increasingly framing trade policy as a two-front problem: how to manage a widening deficit with China while also absorbing new US tariffs. Both dynamics intensified through 2025, and both show up clearly in official trade statistics published this year.

How big is the EU-China trade gap now?

According to Eurostat, the EU's statistical office, the bloc exported €199.6 billion worth of goods to China in 2025 while importing €559.4 billion, leaving a trade deficit of €359.8 billion. Compared with 2024, EU exports to China fell 6.5% while imports rose 6.4%, widening the gap further. Eurostat data also show that since 2015, EU imports from China have grown 89.0%, far outpacing the 37.1% growth in EU exports to China over the same period.

The largest Chinese imports into the EU in 2025 were electrical machinery and audio-visual equipment (€164.9 billion, 29.5% of imports) and machinery and mechanical appliances (€106.5 billion, 19.0%), per Eurostat. On the export side, the EU's biggest category sent to China was machinery and mechanical appliances, at €45.3 billion.

Electric vehicles: the most visible flashpoint

The car sector has become the clearest symbol of Chinese competitive pressure in Europe. Industry body ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers' Association) reports that 1,105,806 new vehicles were imported into the EU from China in 2025, valued at €15.1 billion; of these, 1,002,742 were cars worth €13.7 billion, and 42.9% of Chinese car imports were battery-electric. Chinese-made cars captured 7% of total EU car sales and 20% of EU battery-electric car sales in 2025, according to ACEA. In the reverse direction, the EU exported 161,514 vehicles to China worth €8.5 billion, making China the EU's fifth-largest vehicle export market.

The European Commission responded to this shift by imposing countervailing duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles starting July 5, 2024, citing subsidies it described as unfair. According to Al Jazeera's reporting on the Commission's decision, the provisional duties ranged from 17.4% for BYD to 37.6% for SAIC, with cooperating foreign producers such as Tesla and BMW's Chinese-built models facing 20.8%. China's Ministry of Commerce said at the time it hoped both sides would continue consultations before the measures became permanent, while reserving the option of retaliatory tariffs on European goods such as cognac and pork.

The United States: tariffs as the main lever

Washington's approach to influencing European trade has centered on tariff pressure rather than market-share competition in specific products. On July 27, 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and US President Donald Trump announced a framework trade deal, reported by Euronews, setting a 15% US tariff on most EU exports, including automobiles — down from the 27.5% rate that applied to cars and well below the 30% rate Trump had earlier threatened. Aircraft and components, semiconductor equipment, critical raw materials, and some chemical, agricultural and pharmaceutical products were exempted under a zero-for-zero tariff arrangement. As part of the deal, the EU committed to purchase roughly $250 billion a year in American liquefied natural gas, oil and nuclear fuel, and to channel additional investment into the US economy, according to the same report. Von der Leyen described the deal as bringing greater predictability for businesses on both sides, while Trump called it "the biggest deal ever made."

Where the competition is felt hardest: Central Europe

The squeeze is not evenly distributed across the EU. A report titled "Polska — Europa — Chiny: współpraca czy pułapka uzależnienia?" ("Poland — Europe — China: cooperation or dependency trap?"), produced by the Polish business association Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców together with the Centre for Eastern Studies and cited by Bankier.pl, estimates that Poland lost €11.4 billion in indirect value added in 2025 because of Chinese export expansion, putting roughly 45,000 Polish jobs at risk — concentrated in battery manufacturing, automotive components, household appliances and steel. The same report puts the EU-wide value-added loss to Chinese competition at €87 billion for 2025, with the automotive and electromobility sector accounting for €28.5 billion of that and machinery for €22.1 billion.

Poland's exposure stems largely from its role as a supplier inside German, French and other Western European automotive and machinery supply chains: when those manufacturers scale back production in the face of Chinese competition, orders placed with Polish suppliers fall as well, according to the report cited by Bankier.pl.

Infrastructure and technology: a less quantified front

Beyond trade statistics, Polish commentators have also pointed to a less-measured dimension of the competition. In comments carried by WP.pl, political scientist Bogdan Góralczyk said Chinese carmakers have overtaken German rivals in what he called the most sensitive segment of European industry, and noted that letters sent by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron to EU leadership reflected concern that Europe was approaching what he described as a trade conflict with China. Commentator Tomasz Wróblewski, in the same discussion, argued that heavy construction machinery used on several major European infrastructure projects is Chinese-made, even where the underlying engineering originates from German or French design, and that European financial and communications infrastructure remains dependent on American platforms. These are characterizations offered by commentators in a published discussion, not figures from an official statistical source.

Key figures at a glance

Why this matters now

The two dynamics — a growing Chinese trade surplus with the EU and a new US tariff regime negotiated under pressure — are unfolding simultaneously, which is why European officials increasingly discuss them together rather than separately. For businesses in EU supplier economies such as Poland, the practical effect is twofold: competition for market share from Chinese-made goods on one side, and changed cost conditions for exporting to the US on the other.